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SITUATION

I

TRANSFER AND CAPTURE
States X and Y are at "\var. Other states are neutral.
rrhis war was declared as fro1n March 16.
State X has a large merchant 1narine. The Blue Line
of steamers runs between state X and state D. This
line was owned by a citizen of state X till March 1, fifteen days before the declaration of war, when it was sold
to a citizen of state D. The citizen of stateD on March 18
sells the line to Mr. E, a citizen of state E.
(a) Vessels of war of state Yon March 20 seize ships
.o f the Blue Line as enemy property.
(b) Vessels of "\Var of state Y also seize, on ~1arch 21,
on the high sea a cargo of flour on the Dale of the Blue
Line, which had originally been consigned by a 1nerchant
of state X to a merchant of state D to be paid for on
deli very. The flour was shipped on March 15 and on
March 19, advance payment having been made, title to
the flour was transferred by telegraph to the merchant
of D.
(c) State E announces that if reparation is not immediately made for both the above acts, it will regard these
as violations of neutral rights and convoy its merchant
vessels, giving all convoying commanders orders to prevent visit and search by vessels of state X.
(d) State F, considering that neutral rights will not
be respected, arms its merchant vessels and instructs them
to permit no sub1narines to approach except on the surface, and in case of doubt to endeavor to sink submarines.
How far are all these acts lawful~
1
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(a) The seizure of the ships of the Blue Line on
1\Iarch 20 as enemy property is not lawful.
(b) 'The seizure of the cargo of flour as enen1y property on the Dale on 1\farch 21 is lawful. The transfer
by telegraph on 1\Iarch 19 was not a valid trall$fer as
against state Y.
(c) State E has a lawful right to convoy its merchant
vessels. The right to convoy applies to innocent vessels
only and does not imply a total denial of the right to
visit and search.
(d) The arming of neutral 1nerchant vessels is not
unlawful though since the London K a val Treaty of 1930,
article 22, presumed unnecessary and undesirable. Since
the treaty of 1930 the order in 1·egarcl to sinking submarines would be unlawful for states parties to article
22.
NOTES

General.-Either state X or Y, or perhaps both states,
conforming to international agreen1ents and following
recent practice has declared war on nfarch 16. Other
states are neutral. The laws of 'var and the laws of
neutrality accordingly are operative fron1 that date.
Both X and Y are maritime states and X l1as a large
sea-borne co1nmerce. It is natural that the citizens of
~tate X should take measures for the protection of their
property so far as possible. It is also natural that state
Y should endeavor to meet these 1neasures as far as
possible. A merchant vessel legally flying a neutral
flag is not liable to the same treatment as a belligerent
merchant vessel. Owners of vessels under a belligerent
flag might transfer such vessels to a neutral flag with
the object of escaping belligerent liabilities. Owners of
such vessels might in the exercise of ordinary business
judgment make a sale of vessels. The purchaser might
be a neutral in need of vessels and the transaction in-
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volving the change of flag might be of such a natilre as
would take place in time of peace, but a transaction
-w-hich might be entirely valid as bet,veen the citizens of
two states in ti1ne of peace might be questioned in ti1ne
oi war.
Pre-1lJar period.-There has been .an effort, particularly
during the t,ventieth century, to li1nit the effects of the
war to the period of hostilities and to n1ake this periocl
of vvar definite. This 'vas evident in Hague Convention III relative to the opening of hostilities 'vhich
in article 12 provided that the existence of a state of 'Yar
should be notified to neutrals and should " not take effect in regard to them till the receipt of a notification."
One of the objects of the Hague conventions was to protect international commerce against the surprises of 'var
and to limit the effects of war to the period of hostilities.
Manifestly it is not reasonable that 1nerchants should be
liable for consequences of the possible outbreak of hos-tilities at some period in the indefinite future. Belligerents should, nevertheless, not be deprived of a reasonable
-rlght to capture ships which, though under a neutral flag,
have not been bona fide transferred to the neutral. In
time of peace a merchant or other person 1nay dispose of
his property for any reason which seems good to hi1n and
the property is then liable to such treatment as property
of like character of nationals of the state of the ne'v
owner. If the property has not in fact passed fron1 the
0riginal owner, then· it should be liable to the same treatn1ent as property of like charact€r of other nationals.
of the state of the owner.
The validity of transfer before the war of property
from Mr. N, a national of state N having strained relations with state M, to Mr. D, a national of stateD havjng
no concern in these strained relations, "·ould under ordinary circumstances be presumed.
Bill of sale by Mr. D. to l\fr. E., that is, from one
neutral citizen to another neutral citizen, 1nay not be on.
board, but would give rise to suspicion only, and the bill
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of sale of a citizen of X to a citizen of D "~ould not be
expected to be on board.
Transfers, Gri1nean lVar, 1854-56.-During the war
between Great Britain and Russia seYeral Yes.sels were
brought before the British courts on suspicion of unlawful transfer fron1 Russian to a neutral flag. SeYeral of
these \essels, though concle1nnecl by the lo\Yer court, were
restored by the higher court on the ground "that the
~ale "~as bona fide_: that the property was entirely elivested fron1 the Yenclor~ and Yested in the Yenclee before
the seizure; that the transfer "~as con1plete, and was not
a fraud upon any just right of the belligerents." In
the n1iddle of the nineteenth century it ''as generally
considered that any transfer n1ade in tiine of peace
\vhich would be a Yalicl transfer fron1 Yendor to Yendee
"\Yould be valid in case \Yar should subsequently break out
.and the ,ship should be captured, if the transfer had not
l)een 1nade "~hile the ships were in transitu. The reasons
for rejecting transfers in transitu in the courts of the
n1iddle of the nineteenth century as stated in the case of
the Baltica, 1858, were two:
"The one is, that while the ship is on the seas, the title of the
vendee cannot be completed by actual delivery of the T'essel or
~~;oods; the other is, that the ship and goods ha,·ing incurred the
L·isk of capture by putting to sea, shall not be permitted to defeat
the inchoate right of capture by the belligerent powers, until the
Yoyage is at an end.
"The former, howe,·er, appears to be th~ true ground on which
tl:te rule rests. Such transactions during ·war, or in contemplation of war, are so likely to be merely colourable, to be set up
for the purpose of misleading~ or defrauding captors, the diffi~ulty of detecting such frauds, if mere paper transfers are held
sufficient, is so great, that the courts ha\e laid down as a
general rule, that such transfers, without actual deliYery, shall
be insufficient; that in order to defeat the captors, the possession,
as well as the property, must be changed before the seizure."
(11 )Ioore P. C. 141)

For many years it had been held that ships transferred
in t'raMitu in time of war would not thereby be exempted
from the liability of capture. Xor could vessels be law-
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fully transferred from a belligerent to a neutral flag in
a blockaded port.
Attitude of maritime states, 1908.-In preparation for
the International Naval Conference, London, 1908-09, 10
rnaritin1e states were asked to submit their accepted rules
vpon the topics before the conference. One of the topics
upon which such replies were submitted was that of
transfer of flag. The replies generally considered transfers before the outbreak of war as valid unless there was
evidence of bad faith which n1ight be argued if the transfer was merely to escape the consequences of the war.
The problem before the conference as stated in the general report was :
"An enen1y merchant vessel is liable to capture, 'vhereas a
neutral merchant vessel is spar'ecl. It may therefore be understood that a belligerent cruiser encountering a 1nerchant vessel
'"'·hich lays claim to neutral nationality has to inquire whether
such nationality has been acquired legitimately or for the purpose of shielding the vessel fron1 the risks to which she would
have been exposed if she had retained her former nationality:
This question naturally arises when the transfer is of a elate
comparatively recent at the moment at which the visit and search
trtkes place, whether the transfer may actually be before, or after,
the opening of hostilities. The question will be answered differently according as it is looked at more from the point of view
of commercial or rnore from the point of view of belligerent
interests." (1909 Naval War College, International Law Topicst
p. 121.)

Articles of the Declaration of London.-After much
discussion the International Naval Conference formulated
articles in which transfer of flag of merchant vessels in
accord with legal requirements of the respective states
prior to the opening of hostilities would be presumed to
he valid, though making additional proof necessary if
the bill of sale was not on board and the transfer was
made less than 60 days before the opening of hostilities.
For transfers after the opening of hostilities the presumption was that the transfer was invalid, though in
certain cases proof to the contrary might he entertained.
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In general the ailn ·was to avoid uncertainties by introducing specific regulations which n1ight be understood
by those engaged in 1naritime com1nerce and w·ould not
be left to court interpretation or verbal uncertainties
save in exceptional cases. Such uncertainties 'vere regarded as ineYitable when the basis of legality ""'as considered as resting on the proof of good faith of the
parties to the transaction.
.
J'hne ele1nent in transje1".-At the tin1e of the drafting
of the Declaration of London, the period of 30 clays, if
transfer papers "·ere on board, 'vas regarded as establishing the validity of the transfer of a 1nerchant vessel.
Fifteen clays "·ith present rapidity of con1n1unications
Jnay be equally adequate.
0 hanging asJJects of transfer.-The question as to
transfer of n1erchant vessels fro1n a belligerent to a neutral flag "·as often raised during the 'Vorlcl
ar. New
problen1s and ne"· con1plications 'voulcl, of course, arise
"·ith changing n1eans and 1nethocls of transportation and
eon11nunication. In the early period the ow·nership and
operation of a vessel by the O\vner or the partners of the
O\Yner sharing in the nn.Yigation and in the results of the
,·enture 1nade a transfer con1paratiYely easy to follo,v.
I.. ater, corporate O\Ynership of vessels and the distribution of stock in these corporations through many countries introduced factors \Yhich had to be considered. Further, the distribution and incidence of insurance n1ight
1nake the loss or transfer of a vessel a n1a tter of concern
to other states than those of the vendor and vendee. In
other 'vords, the transfer of the flag of a vessel of a
belligerent 1night be a 1nuch less sin1ple tran~action than
fonnerly, and the belligerents during the 'Vorld ''r ar endeavored to 1neet some of the problems by new expedients
and noYel staten1ents as to legal rights.
Rules of transfer in lVorhllVar.-SeYeral states in entering the "'\Y. oriel "'\\Tar issued regulations in regard to
transfer of vessels ·which \Vere essentially in accord with
the rules of the Declaration of London. The German
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ordinance of Septe1nber 30, 1909, conformed in the main
fe.atures to articles 55 and 56 of the Declaration of London, as did the Japanese regulations of 1914. The instructions for the Navy of the United States, June, 1917,
provided:
" 57. The transfer of a ve~sel from one tiag to another is valid
when completed preYious to the outbreak of \var in which the
State of the Yenclor is a belligerent, proYided the transfer is made
in accordance with the laws of the State of the vendor and the
State of the vendee." (1925 Naval V\rar College, International
Law Documents, p. 114)
. " 58. The transfer of a private vessel of a belligerent to a neutral flag during war is Yalid if in accordance with the laws of
the State of the Yenclor and of the Yendee, provided that it is
m.ade in good faith and is accompanied by a payment sufficient in
amount to leave no doubt of good faith; that it is absolute and
unconditional, with a cmnplete diYestiture of title by the vendor,
and with no right of repurchase by him; and that the ship does
not remain in her old employ1nent." (Ibid, p. 116)

On December 26, 1914, under Argentine general orders,
it was stated without restriction to any period whether
before or after war, that:
'' The transfer of colors shall be consented to under reserve
of its being done upon a basis of absolute good faith, and in the
knowledge that the .Argentine Government will decline all interYention in behalf of those interested if it should afterwards
result that they have not fulfilled this condition." (Ibid., 1917,
p. 30.)

Others n1ade special rules so1newhat dependent upon geographical proximity to the belligerents.
Transfer of tlze Da.cia.-The Dacia, a German Illerchant vessel w·hich in late 1914 'vas unable to n1ake regular Yoyages under the Ger1nan flag o"·ing to the control
of the sea by the Allied fleets, "·as transferred to Ainerican registry. A1nericans conten1plated the purchase of
other Ger1nan vessels si1nilarly circun1stanced, and considered in SOme cases e1nploying these exclusiYely bet,veen
British and American ports.
The original plan of the An1erican shippers 'vas to
dispatch the Dac-ia "·ith a cargo of cotton fron1 Gal Yeston,
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Texas, to Bremen, Ger1nany, but on advice of the Deparhnent of State it 'vas decided to send the Dacia to
Rotterdam. It was agreed that the Dacia should not
stop at any port hostile to the British, and that it might
be detained for examination of the cargo at a British
port. The Secretary of State in a letter of January 13,.
1915, to the British Ambassador said:
" . . . . I now ask if it is not possible, in view of the particular
circumstances of this case, for the British Government to consent
not to raise the question of the transfer of the vessel for this particular voyage, it being understood that neither Government ~·ields
any principle involved and that such action is not to serve as a
precedent hereafter. The Department is convinced that shipment
of cotton in this case is in good faith and that shippers took spaceon the Dacia in the belief that the vessel having been transferred
to the American flag, they could safely ship in the Dacia.'' (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1015, Supplement, .p. 678.)

British attitude, early 1915.-,Vhile the British attitude had not been unchanging, in a ~femorandum of the
British E1nbassy of January 2, 1915, it was stated:
" The British Embassy has received information as to the reported purchase of the German ship Dacia, of the Hamburg-American Line, now l~·ing at Port Arthur, Texas, as a result of the
outbreak of war, by certain American citizens who have applied for
the transfer of the ship to the American flag.
"Further information is to the effect that the purchase price is
one third the nominal value, the principal purchaser is not by
occupation an owner of ships, that he is interested in the metal
trade and that the avowed object of the purchase is to dispatch
the ship to a German port under the American flag.
" The circumstances are no doubt under the consideration of the
competent department of the United States Govern1nent.
" In connection with this 1natter it becomes the duty of the
British Embassy to point out that while it has been the British
and American rule, under certain conditions, to accept as valid
the transfer of vessels from a belligerent to a neutral flag after
the declaration of war, it has also been the rule that such transactions justify the strictest enquiry on the part of the belligerent.
This enquiry bas been in the past based upon the nature of the
purchase, the character and occupation of the purchaser, the composition of the crew, and above all the business on which the ship.
is engaged before and after the transfer.
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"'These considerations will no doubt be familiar to the State
Department but in order to preyent any possible misunderstanding
the British Embassy takes this opportunity to point out that His
1\lajesty's GoYernment 1nust reserYe its rights as to the recognition
of the \alidity of the transfer of the flag under these and similar
circumstances.
CECIL SPRING RICE."

(Ibid., p. 674.)

Soon the exigencies of the \V orld \V ar and particularly
the case of the Dacia gave rise to questions in new forms.
l"'he British A1nbassador in \Vashington in a note to the
American Secretary of State on January 12, 1915, gaYe
a sonle,vhat full statement:
"Dear l\Ir. Secretary: You ask me what is the attitude of my
Government with regard to the transfer of the flag after the
outbreak of hostilities. I beg to state in reply that I haYe not
received any detailed instructions from my GoYernment on this
question although in general they propose to follow the principles
laid down in the Declaration of London.
"As howeYer they have not ratified the declaration it may be
argued that in considering the question they must be guided by
the prindple which (in common with your GoYernment) they
haYe professed in t:n1es 1mst. These principles are, as you are
aware, that the absolute prohibition of sales of ships during
hostilities would be too seYere a measure for a commercial nation,
although such sales must always be regarded with suspicion. It
has, I belieYe. been generally held that the Yalidity of the sale
is judged by its conunercial character; the purchaser must proYe
a bona-fide sale and in general the ship must not be used to sen·e
enemy purposes un<.ler a neutral flag.
" So far, I understand, 111 vessels, formerly foreign, haYe recei\ed American registry since the war began and of these 86
\Yere British and 17 German.
"l\I;y GoYernment has hitherto let such transfers pass without
protest in cases where the Yessel was bona fide owned by an
American company before the war, so that the transfer does not
involve a sale, and where the vessel does not carry an enemy
crew and is not employed in carrying supplies to an enemy or to
a neutral port which is used for supplying an enemy. Cases
where the yessel was originally owned by a non-American owner
are regarded with suspicion because of the possibility that the
transfer of the flag is resorted to for unneutral purposes. In the
case of the Sacramento in San Francisco, a transferred ship was
4448---36--2
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collusiYely seized by a German cruiser and emptied of her ~tore~
of coal for belligerent use. The Dacia has been sold by a German
company to a German-American for one third her value and is
reported to be destined to a German port. The Stoya Romana
was a Roumanian ship which received American registry in the
port of Bremen ; bas cleared from that port, nominally for Ameriea, but has not so far as I know yet arrived here. If loss or
damage results to Great Britain as a consequence of the transfer of these ships it is to be presumed that a claim "~in be 1nade
~ ~ ;!ain::;t the United States Government.
"But eases must arise in which the transfer of the flag is of
a purely commercial character an<l the purcba::;e effected witht•nt any but con1mercial objects. It has not I belieYe been the
rule to contest the Yalidity of the transfer if the bona fides of the
~ale is proYecl and if the ship when she changes her owner is
employed with a neutral crew in neutrr.l trade and between
nc-tl tral ports.
;; The Gennan GoYernment has declared that it would withtlra w its objections to the transfer of a ship from an enemy to
the American flag in cases where the ship traded ex:C'lusiYely
between Amer.ica and Gennany. I think it not improbable, though
I do not write under instructions, that my Government would
raise no further question if a transferred ship were to trad~
Letween any ports not serving as ports of supply to the enemy.
'·There is however the further question of the liberation of
iliterned ships as a consequence of transfer. That is the question
B.s to whether a neutral performs an unneutral act if in the
course of the war he releases a belligerent from the consequences
of military operations. This question is of course both difficult
awl complicated and no doubt, should the occasion arise, would
become the subject for discussion.
'' I am (etc.)
CECIL SPRIXG RicE."
(Ibid., p. 676.)

This note introduces a proposition indicating that
there is a responsibility resting upon a neutral state to
intern belligerent merchant vessels,· and if these depart
there may be a claim against the neutral state. Such a
novel proposition 'vould certainly open questions ·which
v;ould be "both difficult and complicated" and would
also be without any sound basis of reason in international
]a"~-

The case of the Dacia becan1e in some respects a test
cnse. and 'Yas stated in a con11nnnication fron1 the Secre-
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tary of State to the American An1bassador In Great
Britain on Jan nary 14, 1915, as follows:
'' Gennan steamship Dacia recently transferred to American
register due to sail from Galveston with full cargo cotton Friday
or soon thereafter as possible. Owners haYe contemplated Yoyage
to Bremen. Upon Department's suggestion owners of ship and
cargo consent to send ship to Rotterdam direct with entire cargo
cf cotton which is sold for delivery in Gennany by day certain.
Shippers took space on Dacia after American registry in good
faith, believing they could safely ship. Officers and crew entirely
native American citizens. Yessel will go direct to Rotterdam,
not touching at any enemy port, and return this country, agreeing
to detention for exa1nination of cargo. ~o other bottoms available for cotton and shippers threatened with disastrous loss if
unable to use Dacia. Ship bought for half price due to natural
causes fr01n German ships lying idle. Please call on Grey at
once and lay this situation before him in person and seek to have
British GoYernment consent not to raise question of transfer for
this particular yoyage on conditions above stated, neither Governm~nt waiving any principle involved and case not to serve as
precedent hereafter. If arrangement consummated, Departn1ent
\viii issue state1nent that arrangement is agreed to by Great Britain to facilitate this shipment of cotton and case not to ~erYe
as precedent and all prospectiYe transferees of enemy Yessels will
be so adYisecl. Freight rates on cotton are now practically prohibitiYe. Under recent restrictions of British Government, English ships practically denied transfer of register. Parties who
purchased Dacia state they endeavored purchase British and
French ships without success. Report earliest possible moment.
BRYAN."

(Ibid., p. 678.)

'Vhile the British authorities replied that they would
be 'villing to purchase the cargo of the Dac£a, if brought
to a British port, at the price it 'Yould realize at the German destination, the ship itself if cotning under British
authority "~ould be brought before a prize court.
The British mentioned· the sale of such ships as the
Dacia as in effect" the liberation of interned ships during
the course of hostilities."
The argument as presented by the British Secretary of
.S tate for Foreign Affairs is repeated by the A1nerican
A1nbassador in a con1n1unication of ,January 18, 1915:
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My inquiry whether British Government would object to
"
purchase and transfer of German interned ships to ply between
American and British 11orts brought from Sir Edward Grey the
n1ost ominous conversation I have ever had with him.
"He explained that the chief weapon that England has against
any enemy is her navy and that the navy may dan1age an enemy
in two ways: By fighting and by economic pressure. Under the
conditions of this war economic pressure is at least as important
as naval fighting. One of the chief methods of using economic
pressure is to force the German Inerchant ships off the seas. If,
therefore, these be bought and transferred to a neutral flag this
pressure is removed.
"lie re1ninded me that he was not making official representations
t0 the United States Government and for that reason be was the
more emphatic. If the United States without intent to do Great
Britain an injury, but 1noved only to relieve the scarcity of tonHuge, should buy these ships it would still annul one of the vic·
tories that England bas won by her nav~·. He reminded me of
the fast-rising tide of criticism of the United States about the
transfer of the Dacia. and he declared that this has intensified and
spread the feeling against us in England on account of ouc note
of protest. He spoke earnestly, sadly, ominously, but in the friendliest spirit . . . They (the English) regard the Dacia as a German
ship put out of cmnmission by their navy. She comes on the seas
again by our permission which so far nullifies their victory. If she
comes here she will, of course, be seized and put into the prize
court. Her seizure will strike the English imagination in effect
as the second conquest of her-first frmn the Germans and now
from the Americans. Popular feeling will, I fear, run as high as
it ran over the Trent affair; and a very large part of English opinion will regard us as enen1ies.
''If another German ship should follow the Dacia here I do not
think that any government could withstand the popular demand
for her confiscation; and if we permit the transfer of a number
of these ships there will be such a wave of displeasure as will make
a return of the recent good feeling between the two peoples impossible for a generation. There is no possible escape froin such
an act being regarded by the public opinion of this Kingdom as a
distinctly unfriendly and practically hostile act." (Ibid., p. 682.)

On January 23, 1915, the President directed a reply to
so1ne of the notes recently received from the American
Ambassador in Great Britain. This note pointed out
some of the causes of irritation which British action
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the Dacia, he said :
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Referring particularly to

" The Dac,ia case has received a great deal of newspaper notoriety
because of predictions as to what would be done with her. Breitung, seeing that there was a chance to profit by the high freight
rates, decided to buy a ship. He first tried to buy an English ship
and then a French ship but, as his correspondence shows, he failed
to secure a ship from either country. He then bought the Dacia,
paying for it about three fourths of what it cost fourteen years
ago when it was built. He secured a cargo of cotton and intended
to sail for Bremen. 'Yhen he was informed that it would be wiser
tr. go to Rotterdam he changed the route and planned to sail to
Rotterdam. The inquiries which have come to the State Department have come from the owners of the cotton, rather than from
the owner of the ship. The Governn1ent has had nothing to do with
the transaction further than to make inquiries for interested parties.
Whether the ship is taken into the prize court or not is a question
between the British Government and the owner of the ship, but, if
it is taken into the prize court the court will of course decide upon
the evidence produced and so far as we know the evidence will
support the bona fides of the transactions. If the evidence shows
that the sale was made in good faith, the transfer cannot be objected to according to the rules recognized by both Great Britain
.and the United States. A change in these rules at this time could
not be n1ade by the United States and it would seem to be an inopportune time for Great Britain to change them. Great Britain
fears that the Dacia n1ight be tnade a precedent and that other
·German interned ships would be bought in case the Dacia sale was
not contested. That is true and yet the precedent would only stand
in case the sales were bona fide in which case they would come
within the rules. The chief point presented in your. despatch is
that Great Britain is trying to bring pressure to bear upon Germany by preventing tlle sale of interned German ships. This is
perfectly legitimate so loug as the pressure is exerted according to
the international law, but the pressure becomes illegitimate if wellsettled rules are violated, and a well-settled rule would be violated
if an attempt was tnade to prevent a bona, fide sale.
"The point which should be made very clear to the British
authorities as our vie'v and purpose in the whole matter, if such
purchases are made, is that as a matter of actual fact such purebases do not constitute a restoration of German commerce to the
seas. Such ships would not and could not be used on the former
routes or with the former and usual cargoes and would serve as
German commerce in no particular. They would serve only t h(~

14

TRAXSFETI AND CAPTURE

tl'ade of the United States with neutral countries and within the
limits necessarily set by war and all its conditions. The withdrawal of so many ships frmn the seas is so far a curtailment of
the commerce of the United States. The Unite(l States cannot in
the circumstances sell articles to Germany which the rules of war
or the circumstances now existing forbid. The owners of the
ships bought from German owners cannot use them on the routes
or to the ports which would sen·e thPir former owners as the
carriers of German commerce. They would be used on new routes
and for the release of American merchandise to new vorts. They
would represent an extension of American commerce, not a
renewal of German. 'rhis cannot be justly or eYen plausibly
reganled as an effort to relieYe the vresent economic pressureon Germany or to recreate anything that Great Britain had a
right to destroy. America must have shil)S and must have them
for these uses. She will build them if she cannot find the1n for
sale. The legitimate restoration of An1erican commerce may be
delayed but it cannot be prevented. It cannot be part of the
purpose of the British Government to pl1t an intolerable economic
pressure on the United States, as might ven· ensily be the result
if its attitude as reflected in your note is maintained." ( lbid.-p. 685.)

The American An1bassador in Great Britain see1ned
to see 1nore than the legal and political aspects o£ the case
and said, " I cannot exaggerate the o1ninousness o£ the
situation. The case is not technical but has large human
and patriotic and historic elen1ents in it." (Ibid., p. 683.)
The A1nerican A1nbassador in his con11nnniration to the
Secretary o£ State see1ned even 1nore concerned than th~
British E]nbassy had been on Jan nary 2, 1915, 'vhen in
stating the British vie'v upon transfer the legal attitude
had been under consideration. In the early British con1Inunication in regard to the Dacia, there had been no suggestion that neutrals assu1ned responsibility £or inte_rnmcnt o£ 1nerchant vessels or that they n1ight not rc1nain
indefinitely and be the subject of 111e1Tantile transactions,
and, liable to usual la,Ys of prize~ depart under any .flag.
French attitude, early 1915.-Questions had arisc'n 'in
regard to transfer of vessels 'vhich, beca usc of practic~l
certainty that they 'voulcl be captured if they 'vent to sea,
''"ere still in neutral ports. rrhe French Govenunent had
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indicated, in 1908-09, that it was in substantial accord W'ith
the vie'v of the United States as expressed at the LonJon
Naval Conference, but that vessels tied up in neutral ports
because of risk in going to sea 'vere not in the categories
under consideration. Of these vessels the French .A. lnbassador in a letter to the American Secretary of S'ta te,
January 16, 1915, said:
"My Government wishes your excellency's kind attention, which

is known to be devoted to international justice, to be called anew
t0 this proble1n. It trusts that you will readily ad1nit that the
contingency of flag transfers about which we cannot but be concerned and in which we could not acquiesce without breaking our
own laws publicly announced even in time of peace, would, if it
came to pass, be tantamount to supplying our enemies with financial means for carrying on the war and for escaping the consequences of the command of the· sea gained by the Allied fleets, not
without battles and losses. It appears no exaggeration to say
that, in case a contingency so harmful to my Government's interests should, contrary to its firm hopes, become a reality, the purchase of German merchant ships in their present tied-up condition
would an1ount to an act of assistance to our enemies. We take
the. proclamations of the President of the United States, as stated
in n1y preYious communication, to be a safe guaranty that he could
not wish any such harm done to our country by his.
" Be pleased (etc.)
JussERAND "
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1915, Supplement, p. 681.)

On February 16, 1915, the Ambassador of France in
Washington addressed a communication to the Secretary
of State of the United States in regard to transfer of
American-owned vessels sailing under a foreign flag and
to be transferred to tl~e American flag.
"l\fR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Referring to the communications
which I ha Ye previously had occasion to 1nake to your excellency
on the subject of vessels :sailing under a foreign flag but owned
by Americans, which may be transferred to the A1nerican flag by
virtue of the act of August 18, last, I haYe the honor to infonn
you that my Government wishes to make it clear that our recogn~tion of such a transfer is to be understood in the sense hereinbelow stated, which, as your excellency will acknowledge, is in
conformity with logic and practiced rules;
"1. The recognition of a transfer effected under the aboYestatert conditions presupposes, of course, that the transaction is
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bona fide and that the vessel is not to be under the direction or
in the service of enemy interests either before or after the
transfer.
"2. Reliable reports which have reached the Government of
the Republic show that the German Government has refused to
recognize such transfers except when the vessels concerned were
to sen·e German interests. The 11rinciple of equalit~· which governs the relations between neutrals and be]ligerents preYents the
Allied Governments from respecting, in such case, any trade that
Inight be carried on with Germany under the American flag as
long as that power does not, for its part, respect trade carried on
·with the Allied countries under absolutely similar conditions.
"3. Recognition of the transfer to the American flag of an
enem~· vessel under the special circumstances accepted by the
Allied Governments may not and n1ust not, by reason of the foregoing, be taken for granted and effectiYe exce11t when the vessel
availing itself of it does not actually sen·e enemy interests by
sailing or trading for the account of an enemy country.
"4. It is important to note that subjects of an enemy country
who may be kept in the crew of the vessels transferred to the
American flag would be liable to arrest as being subject to
n1ilitary service, in accordance with the decision jointly reached
by the French and English Govenunents which was made public
throug-h insertion in the Jonrnal of{iciel de la Republique francaise of the 3cl of Nove1nber last." "J"GSSERAND." (Ibid., p. 690.)

The Rw;sian Ambassador had, a few days previously,
informed the Secretary of State that the Russian Government adhered to the French position.
Decision in case of the Dacia.-The Dacia was captured
by the French auxiliary cruiser Europe on February 27,
1915. The Daaia was brought before the Consul des
Prises and the decision was rendered August 3-5, 1915.
The decision referred to the provisions of the Declaration of London and many other docun1ents, but finally
pronounced the Dacia good prize:
"Decide:
"Est declaree bonne et valable la capture du vapeur Dacia, ensemble ses agres, apparaux, armement et approvisionnements de
toute nature, effectuee le 27 fevrier 1915 par le croiseur auxiliaire
de la Republique Europe, pour le prix en etre attribue aux ayants
droit conformement aux lois et reglements en Yigueur;
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" Seront restitues aux ayants droits les objets et effets, propriete personnelle du capitaine et de !'equipage, et ne constituant
pas des articles de contrebande."
(1922 Naval 'Var College, International Law Decisions, p. 37;
[1916] Decisions du Conseil des Prises, p. 180.)

Corporate o1vnership.-The liability of a merchant vessel to capture may in the case of ownership by a corporation depend upon the nationality o£ the actual owners
and their relation to the employment of the vessel. Such
was the condition in the case of the H {l!Jnborn, belonging
to a company incorporated before the World War under
the laws of the Netherlands though the control was
wholly in German nationals and questions of Dutch law
and international law were involved. This vessel was
captured and brought before the British prize court where
it was condemned, December 12, 1917 ( [1918] p. 19.)
The case on appeal came before the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council 'v hich sustained the prize court
decision and said :
" If the case turned on her user de fa-c to at the time of capture
it would be simple: so it would be, if her owners were natural
persons of neutral nationality de jure, neither adhering to the
enemy nor allowing their chattel to be used in enemy service.
The present case is more complex. The criteria for deciding
enemy character in the case of an artificial person differ from
those applicable to a natural person, since in the nature of things
conduct, which is one of the most important matters, can in the
former case only be the conduct of those who act for or in the
name of the artificial person. It was decided in the case of The
Daimler 001npany, Limited v. The Continental Tyre and Rubber
Company (Great Britain), Limited, that, in the case of an incor-

porated company, the right and power of control may form a
true criterion, the control, that is, of those persons, \Vho are the
active directors of the company and whose orders its officers must
obey, or the control of those persons, who in their turn are the
masters of the directorate and make or unmake it by the use
of the controlling majority of votes. The application of this test
ptesents no difficulty here, for no living person and no sentient
mind exercised or possessed any control over the Hantborn Steamship Company except persons and minds of enemy nationality.
The residence of the two German managers in Rotterdam if not
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altogether immaterial, at any rate cannot affect the result, since
the question is not one of trading with enemy subjects, resident
m· carrying on business in a neutral country, but is one of the
character of an artificial persona, whose trade is carried on for
it under the supreme direction and control of enemies born.
Their Lordships agree with a passage of the President's judgment,
which sufficiently represents the true gist of his reasoning:
"'The centre and whole effective control of the business of the
Ha1nborn Stean1ship Company was in Germany. Having regard
to these facts, the Yessel must be regarded in this Court as belnnging to German subjects,'
in a claim by captors for condemnation."

( [1919] A. C. 993.)

.Abrogation of Article 57, Declaration of London....:\..rticle 57 of the Declaration of London read :
·' Subject to the provisions respecting the transfer of flag, the
neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag
which she has the right to fly.
" The case in which a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which
i.~ resen·ed in time of peace, remains· outside the scope of. and
is in no wise affected by, th;s rule." (1909 :Xaval 'Var College,
International Law Topics, p. 131.)

This article aimed to safeguard the rights of belligerents and of neutrals and recognized the difference between ow·nership of ships and O\Ynership of cargoes.
The understanding was set forth in the general report,
presented to the conference on behalf of the drafting
ccnnmittee, which said:
"The principle, therefore, is that the neutral or enemy character of a ressel is cletennined by th~ flag 1ch{ch she lw.~ tlte 1·ight
to fly. It is a simple rule which appears satisfactorily to 1neet
the special case of ships, as compared with other n1ovable property, and especially \Vith merchandise. From 1nore than one
point of view, ships have a kind of individuality; especially they
have a nationality, a national clzaracter. This ·nationality is
manifest in the right to fly the flag; it places the ships under the
protection and control of the State to which they belong; it
makes them amenable to the sovereignty and to the laws of that
State, and, should the occasion arise, to requisition. This is the
surest test of whether a Yessel is really a part of the merchant
marine of a country, and therefore the best test for determining
whether she is neutral or enemy. It is, moreover, expedient to
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rely exclusiYely upon this test, and to discard whateYer is connected with the personal status of the owner.
"The text mentions: the flag which the vessel has the ri-ght
to fly J. that means, naturally, the flag which, whether she is
actually flying it or not, the vessel has the right to display
according to the laws which goYern the port of the flag." (Ibid.,
p. 131.)

This article 57 had been 9perative during the early
part of the 'Vorld 'Var and had in general seemed satisfactory, but after discussions upon the Dacia and other
transfers, the British and French Govern1nents gave notice of the abrogation of article 57 and the British Order
in Council of October 20, 1915, also stated that, "In lieu
Df said article, British prize courts shall apply the rules
ftnd principles for1nerly obs~rved in such courts."
The French explanation of its attitude in annulling the
rule .tha.t .the "neutral or enemy character of a vessel is
determined by the flag 'vhich she has the right to fly "
is stated so1newhat definitely in a report to the President
of the Republic.
"PARIS, October 23, 1915.
~'

SIR: Among the rules of international maritime law, formulated· by the declaration signed at London February 26, 1909,

which was not ratified, but which is being actually applied by
tl;le. decree of Noven1ber 6, 1914, during the present war with
certain reservations, consisting in some additions and modifications, . the ruling inscribed under Article 57 of this declaration establishes an absolute presumption of the neutral or ene1ny character of vessels according to the flag the vessel · has a right to
carry.
" .Experience has IH'OYecl that such a strict rule is in practice
capable of leading to inexact solutions. · It may happen that for
cummercial purposes, during a time of peace, vessels were regula'rly: registered under a- flag which has become an enemy one by
t·eason of the war, while in reality the interests vested in the
ownership of these vesl:lels belong to nationals of a third country
w~i~h rna~ be neutral or Allied.
Conversely vessels registered
under a neutral flag may as a matter of fact represent enemy
interests.
"The reunion of capital in the form. of societies· renders· these
combinations particular!~· easy to realize thanks -to the real personality, legally capable of holding property, and to the nationality
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which the law recognizes and accords to societies independently
of the personality or the nationality of the individuals who own
interests in it.
" One of the objects which a belligerent may legitimately pursue
on the high seas according to international law is to annihilate
by capture the mercantile n1arine of the enemy. If by attacking
neutral interests represented by a \essel registered under the
enemy's flag the belligerent deviates from the aforementioned aim
and finds himself accused of violating the liberty of neutral commerce, his right to act legitimately is directly injured by the employment of registration under a neutral flag covering enemy
interests with a protection which nothing justifies.
" If these \iews, which ha\e also struck our Allies, appear to you
to be well founded, I have the honor to submit for your approbation the following draft of a decree.
RE~E YIYIANI,

Tlze President of the Council and
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
YICTOR A "C'GAGNEUB
Tlze Minister of Marine.

(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1915, Supplement, p. 180.)

The purpose of the annuhnent of article 57 by the
. A..llied Powers was to enable the prize courts to look beyond the right to fly the flag to the actual o'vnership of
the vessel 'vhich might be a corporation, the stock of
which was for the most part ene1ny- rather than neutralO""'ned. That the owner should bear the legitin1ate risk
of loss in case of capture seen1ed a logical conclusion, and
ownership which n1ight in tin1e of peace be advantageous
to all, might in time of war, if carried by a neutral flag,
escape such liability. British subjects who owned vessels
or shares in vessels under neutral flags had realized the
Habilities. Even though this n1ight be the situation in
regard to belligerent o'vnership and even though article
57 of the Declaration of London n1ight not be operative,
this did not imply that belligerent merchant vessels reInaining in neutral ports for whatever reason were ipso
facto " interned ", in the technical n1eaning of that term,
as some of the communications had i1nplied.
Internnwnt.-For maritime relations the doctrine of
internment ·was comparatively recent, applied particu-
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larly during and since the Russo-Japanese \Var, 1904-05.
Internment implied a detention of a vessel of ·war in a
neutral port pending some agreement as to its disposition. The neutral authorities as;;umed reasonable responsibility for the n1aintenance of this detention. The
belligerent vessel of war might be detained at a naval
station, the cre·w might be si1nilarly detained, and the
officers were usually placed on parole. Son1etimes essential parts of the machinery and of the guns 'vere removed from the ve~sel. Vessels of 'var of a belligerent
were ordinarily permitted to remain in a neutral port
only 24 hours without becoming liable to internment.
No such restrictions rested upon belligerent merchant
vessels in neutral ports. These vessels could, so far as
the neutral was concerned,
and come at pleasure subject to the usual commercial restrictions. If a merchant
vessel of a belligerent preferred to remain in port rather
than to depart, there 'vas no la'v or custom to the contrary. There was no 24-hour rule of sojourn.
Transfer of goods in transitu.-From early days o.f
mariti1ne trade transfer in ti1ne of peace of goods in
tTamitu 'Ya~ a common and "\veil recognized practice.
It. 'vas sometimes maintained :

go

"that a mere deliYering of the bill of lading is a transfer
of the property;" * * * " 'Vhen war intervenes, another
rule is set up by Courts of Admiralty, which interferes with
the ordinary practice. In a state of war, existing or imminent, it is held that the property shall be deemed to continue
as it was at the time of shipinent till the actual delivery;
this arises out of the state of war, which gives a belligerent
a right to stop the goods of his enen1y. If such a rule did
not exist, all goods shipped in the ene1ny's country, would be
protected by transfers which it would be hnpossible to detect.
It is on that principle held, I belieYe, as a general rule, that
property cannot be conYertecl in tran.situ; and in that sense
I recognize it as the rule of this Court. But this arises, as
I haYe said, out of a state of war, which creates new rights
in other parties, and cannot be applied to transactions originating, like this, in a time of peace. The transfer, therefore,
must be considered as not inYalid in point of law, at the
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time of the contract; and being made before the war. it must
be judged according to the ordinary rules of commerce. ''
(The Vro~w Jlargm·etha (1799), 1 C. Robinson Reports, 336.)

1.,his transfer in tran:3itu having taken place before the
'var and w·ithout intention to aYoid the consequences of
the 'var "·as valid. The burden of proof of liability to
capture in cases of transfers in transitu./ rests upon the
captor.
If a transfer in transitu 'vas n1ade because of the iinIninence of the 'var, the sale ''as regarded as inYalid by
the captor of the goods. Sir \'Tillian1 Scott in 180± in
the case of the Jan Frederick said:
" The motiYe may indeed be difficult to be proYed-but that will
be the difficulty of particular cases: Supposing the fact to be
established, that it is a sale under an a(lmitted necessity, arising
fro In a certain expectation of war; that it is a sale of goods not
in the possession of the seller, and in a state where the~· could
not, during war, be legally transferred, on account of the fraud
(Jn Belligerent rights ;-I cannot but think that the same fraud is
conunitted against the Belligerent, not indeed as an actual Belligerent, but as one \Yho was, in the clear expectation of both the
contracting parties, likely to become a Belligerent, before the
arrival of the property, which is made the subject of their agreement. The nature of both contracts is identicallr the same, being
equally to protect the property fr01n capture of war-not indeed
i:i1 either case from capture at the present moment ·when the contract is made, but fro1n the danger of capture, when it was likely
to occur. The object is the same in both instances, to afford a
guarantee against the sa1ne crisis: In other "·ords, both are done
for the purpose of eluding a Belligerent right, either present or
Pxpected. Both contracts are framed with the same ani1no
traudandi, and are, in n1y opinion, justly subject to the same rule."
(The Jan Frederick (1804), 5 C. Robinson Reports, 128.)

In this case Sir \'Tillian1 Scott also sa~. s "the sa1ne rule
of la'v is to be applied to such contracts ln. tJ·ansitu~ n1ade
in anticipation of 'var, as are applied to si1nilar contracts
in time of actual hostilities." It has been 1naintained
that the ele1nent 'Yhich invalidates the transfer is the
" atte1npt to defeat the rights of belligerent captors."
(The Southfield [1915], 1 B. & C. P. C., p. 332.) Refer~
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ring in this case to " conten1plation of 'var " and to war
as "im1ninent ", Sir Sa1nuel Evans said in its proper
meaning in1minent is "threatening or about to occur."
In the extended opinion in the case of the [{ro·n prinzessin lJf arga1·eta, the Parana, etc., an1ong other pronounceinents, it was laid down in 1920 that:
"The rule against recognizing transfers of enemy goods while
at sea, if unacc01npanied by actual delivery and transfer of possession, is so well established and is now so ancient that its authority
cannot be questioned or its utility impugned for the purposes of a
judicial determination. Its application assumes that the circumstances of the shipment, and the dealings with the shipping documents and otherwise, are not such as to make the shipment itself
an actual delivery of the goods to the transferee through his agent
the carrier. It assumes also that a docu1nentary transfer has
taken place in good faith by a ·real and not a shan1 transaction,
and that in pursuance of that transfer 1ights have been acquired
by the transferee, which in other Courts not bound by such a rule
·w ould be valid and enforceable. 'Vith shan1 transactions Courts
of Prize would deal in another fashion; with incomplete transactions insufficient to transfer rights, no Court would deal at all.
The expression 'mere paper transaction ', sometimes used, does
not imply that smnething unreal or ineffectual in itself is under
discussion. It serves to draw attention to the fact that the transaction is unaccompanied by any dealing with the goods themselves,
such as by its overt or notorious character would serve to infonn
the captor as to the subject which he seizes and the nature of the
right, if any, which he may be entitled to acquire in consequence.'~
(1 A. C. [1H21] 486.)

Oonvoy.-The Naval 'Var College carried on a discussion upon the subject of convoy in 1911 soon after the
publication of the unratified Declaration of Londo.n.
This discussion was with view to calling attention to
so1ne of the existing special treaty proyisions in regard to
protection of neutral vessels. The right of conyoy has
been a subject of controYersy for nearly 300 years
and the a ppljcability of convoy as a right re1nains
undeter1nined. In the 'Var College discussion of 1911, it
was shown that there seen1ed to be a tendency to accept
convoy as a right. Great Britain had generally opposed
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though occasionally by treaty had agreed to the practice,
nncl in the British Achniralty :Jianual of Prize Law of
1888 had asserted in regard to visit and search,
'' Xo vessel is exempt from the exercise of these powers on the

ground that she is under the conYoy of a neutral public ship."

In the n1en1oranchun setting forth the British Yie,Ys in
preparation for the London X a val Conference of 1908-09,
it was said:
" 7. A neutral vessel is not entitled to resist the exercise of the
right of search by a belligerent war-ship on the ground that she is
under the convoy of a war-ship of her own nationality ; forcible
resistance by her or by the neutral war-ship to the exercise of the
right of search is ground for condemnation of both ship and cargo."
(Correspondence and Documents respecting the International Naval Conference. :\lise. Xo. 4 (1909), Cd. 4554, p. 4.)

In support of this position, citations "-ere giYen to the
case of the J/ a1·ia, 17D9 ( 1 C. Robinson Reports, 340), and
the Etsabe ( 4 C. Robinson Reports~ ±OS).
Sir Ed ward Grey in his letter to Lord Desat't, the
British Plenipotentiary, however, said:
" 18. The question of the right to visit, ~earch, ancl seize neutral
ships when under convoy is one on which there has been a clear
divergence between the old continental system and the British doctrine. That doctrine bas howe\er not been enforced in any recent
war. In 1854 the right to visit ships under conYoy was specifically
wah-eel, owing to the clifficulty inherent in naYal co-operation with
an allied Power which did not recognize that right. X or have
His ::\Iajesty's Govenunent since attempted to exercise it. The
situation was radically changed by the Declaration of Paris, which
put an end to the right formerly enjoyed. of seizing enemy gouds
other than contraband, under whateYer flag carried. and His
::\Iajesty's GoYernment are now desirous of limiting as n1uch as
possible the right to seize for contraband, if not eliminating it
altogether. In proportion as the lists of contraband are reducedand there is good ground for hoping that this will be successfully
done in a large measure-the value of the right to seize for contraband automatically diminishes. "\Vhilst accordingly, on the one
hand, the importance to a belligerent of the right to seize vessels
under convoy bas lost most of its value, the principle of exemption
is, on the other hand, favourable to neutral trade, and in conformity with the spirit of British policy. This is therefore one of
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the cases where, owiug to the force of changing circumstances,
the original British contention has practi~ally lost its importance,
so that its specific abandonment would effect no substantial alteration in the actual situation, and may very well be admitted to be
little more than the formal acknowledglnent of a now genera1Iy
accepted rule." (Parliamentary Papers, 1\Hsc. No. 4, International
Naval Conference. ( 1909'), Cd. 4554, p. 25.)

Declaration of London on convoy.-""\;Vhile there were
differences of vie'v a1nong the 10 naval powers participatIng in the International Naval Conference of 1908-09,
the conciliatory attitude of Great Britain made agreement upon the question easier than had been expected
and agreement occasioned much satisfaction to the Conference. This was particularly true because many states
had treaties according respect to convoys. rrhe treaties
between Continental Europ.e an states and American
states generally recognized the right of convoy.
Article 61 of the Declaration of London was as
follows:
"Neutral vessels under convoy of their national flag are exempt
from search. The con1mander of a convoy gives, in writing,
at the request of the com1nander of a belligerent ship of war, all
information as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes,
which could be obtained by visit and search.'' (1909 Naval \Var
College, International Law Topics, p, 139.)

of this article the general report says.:
"If neutral Governments allow belligerents to visit and search
vessels sailing under their flag, it is because they do not wish
to assume the responsibility for the supervision of such vessels,
ftnd therefore allow belligerents to protect the1nselves. The situation changes when a neutral Government consents to assume
that responsibility; the right of visit and search has no longer
the same ground.
"But it follows from the explanation of the rule given respecting convoy that the neutral Government undertakes to give
the belligerents every guarantee that the vessels convo~·ed shall
not take advantage of the protection which is accorded to them
in order to do anything contrary to neutrality, for example, to
carry contraband of ·war, to render unneutral service to the
belligerent, to attempt to Yiola te blockade. " * * *
4448-35--3
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"A written declaration is requirell, because it prevents all ambiguities and Inisunderstandings, and because it binds n1ore fully
tl.e responsibility of the conunander. This declaration has for its
aim to mal~e visit and search unnecessary by the n1ere fact that
this would afford to the cruiser the information which the visit
and search itself would have supplied." (Ibid., p. 139.)

In order that the comn1ander of the visiting vessel
may be even 1nore secure in his opinion as to the innocence of the vessels under convoy, article 62 provided:
" If the conunander of the belligerent ship of war has reason
to suspect that the confidence of the commaiHler of the convoy
has been abused, he com1nunicates his suspicions to him. In such
a case it is for the commander of the convoy alone to conduct an
investigation. He must state the result of such investigation in
a report, of which a copy is furnished to the officer of the ship of
war. If, in the opinion of the commander of the convoy, the
facts thus stated justify the capture of one or n1ore ves~els, the
r.rotection of the convoy n1ust be withdraw·n from such vessels."
(Ibid., p. 141.)

If the conunancler of the visiting cruiser is not then
satisfied, he n1ay protest and there ,yould be resort to diplomatic settle1nent. If the convoying connnander 'vithdr~nvs his protection the 1nerchant Yessel cannot co1nplain
because " She has deceived her o'vn Govern1nent, and has
tried to decei 'Te the belligerent."
Of this Article the report of the British Delegates to
Sir Ed ,yard Grey said :
" In pursuance of the directions contained in ~ection 18 of our
general instructions, we intimated to the Conference that Great
Britain was willing to recognize the inununity frmn visit and
search of neutral Yessels under convoy, as one of the now generally accepte(l principles of international law. This attitude on our
part naturally smoothed the way for the adoption of the rules comprised in chapter YII of the Declaration. Some controversy arose
as to the procedure to be prescrib(\d in cases where it was found
that the officer commanding the convoy had been deceived, and that
contraband was in fact carried on board a vessel or vessPl'i under
his convoy. The solution adopted, as embodied in article 62, vindicates in every resvect the freedom from belligerent interference
of the convoying officer. It is he \Vho alone is to investigate any
allegations made against a particular vessel or vessels forming
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part of his convoy, and only if he is satisfied of their truth is be
called upon to withdraw his protection from the offending vessels.
These provisions seen1 to us to be the logical deductions to be
drawn frmn the principle of immunity if once admitted, and we
therefore agreed to them. It tna;y be well to point out that any
failure on the part of the commander of the convoy to carry out
the obligations ilnposed upon hirn under .Article 62 could not be
redressed by resort to the International Court, which would have
no jurisdiction in such a matter. The injured belligerent would
have to seek his remedy by way of diplomatic representation."
(Parliamentary Papers, ~lise. ~o. -1, International Naval Conference ( 190H), Cd. 455-1, p. 100.)

As the British GoYernn1ent see1ned to have in 1909
taken the position in regard to convoy that generally prevailed, the question 'vas considered practically settled
and rules in regard to nav-al ··warfare 'vere dra,vn accordingly.
Attitude of the United States in 191.1;.-In reply to a
question raised in early August 1914 as to ·whether the
TJnited States would "look 'vith favor on furnishing
escorts for fleets of grain-carrying stean1ers destined for
France", the Secretary of State said:
" DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

August 8, 1914.
Referring to telegran1 fro1n \Yichita l\lill and Elevator Conlpany, wheat and provisions are classed as conditional contraband
cf war under generally accepted principles of international law,
and therefore subject to capture and confiscation by belligerent
vessel if destined for a belligerent government, its army or navy,
or its port blockaded or held by military forces; if not so destined they are not contraband of war. Holland is not now at
war and wheat and foodstuffs destined for use in that country
not considered contraband of war. Persons are free to sell or
ship foodstuffs from United States in ordinary commercial transactions without violating United States neutrality laws. Pending
rassage of bill before Congress, foreign boats referred to nuty not
be registered in United States. This Government could not "'ell
furnish escort for fleet of grain steamers as such escort might
involve United States in serious complications.
W. J. BRYAN."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914, Supplement, p. 274.)
\YASHINGTOX,
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Of course any action 1nay involve co1nplication as 1nay
inaction, but in August 1914, there 'vas a general belief
in Europe that the United States 'vould n1aintain the neutral rights of its citizens, but "·ould not interfere "·ith
the belligerents. ~Iany suggestions 'Yere made both by
belligerents and neutrals in regard to convoying, but in
general conYoying of neutral 1nerchant vessels was not
COI11n10n.
S1cedish proclaJnation, 1915.-The ICing of S"·eden by
procla1nation of October 29, 1915, stated that the purpose
of conYoying "·as to "afford'' Swedish 1nerchant ships
J>rotection against search and detention by 'varships of
foreign po,Yers.
"4. l\lerchant ships which carry contraband of war, or which
may reasonably be susl)ected of intending to render assistance contrary to the laws of neutrality to a neutral power, may not under
any circumstances be included in the conYoy.
" 5. In order to preYent 111erchant ships referred to in Section 4
being included in the conYo~·, such 111easures of control as are
considered suitable 1nay be taken with regard to ships for which
convoying _has been applied for." (Foreign Relations, U. S. 1915, Sup. p. 628; 1018 Naval \Var College, International Law Documents, p. 154.)

Ar1ned neutral 1nerchant vessels.-\,Thile neutral nlerchant vessels were as a general rule ar1ned against" pirates
and thieving robbers" in early days, such arming ,yas
not comn1on after the 1niddle of the nineteenth century.
The Declaration of Paris of 1856 in stating" Privateering
is and remains abolished" ".,.as thought to put an end to
the need of arn1ed n1erchant vessels. There had been
1nany bilateral treaties before this date forbidding priYat€ering, as the treaty bet,Yeen the United Provinces and
s,veden, 1675; between the United States and Prussia,
1785; and son1e of these early treaties 1nade the penalty
for priYateering the sa1ne as for piracy.
The ''"ords '"piracy" and "priYateering" "·ere often
used "·ithout clear distinction and son1eti1nes the conduct of pirates and of privateers ".,.ere Yery si1nilar, and
each 'vord had varying 1neanings.
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Piracy has had many definitions in the municipal la,vs
of states. In general piracy fron1 the international point
of view is an unauthorized act of violence or depredation
for private ends or showing, as "·as formerly said, aninlus
furandi and conunitted outside any national jurisdiction.
A privateer is usually conunissioned by a letter o:f
marque and reprisal or by son1e other authorization permitting a vessel to prey upon the property of a foreign
state or of the citizens of that state.
There may be reason for questioning the grounds for·
arming private vessels of belligerents in ti1ne of war and
this question has been much discussed. The arming of
neutral n1erchant vessels would be on grounds distinct
from those supporting the arming of belligerent merchant
vessels, and during recent wars piracy and privateering
would not be among these grounds.
Defense has been a usual ground for the use of force.
Convoy has been resorted to as a 1nethod of defense·
against unlawful interference with neutral rights. In
convoy there is a responsible state agency acting in defense of the neutral rights with a presumption that these
rights are clearly understood by the coininancler of the
conYoy and that he is acting under instructions from his .
state.
The arming of neutral 1nerchant vessels would put a
responsibility upon the 1naster of the vessel for 'vhich he
presumably had not been trained and in the exercise of
which much would be left to chance.
The treatment of armed neutral merchant vessels dur·
ing the "\Vorld "\Var gave rise to discussion but there 'vasno uniform opinion upon the subject.
Attitude of belligerent t01card a·r1ned neutral merchant
vessels.-There was uncertainty on the part of Great
Britain even in regard to the ar1necl British merchant vessels, and in a message of An1bassador Page to the Secretary of State on January 5~ 1917, this uncertainty is.
somewhat fully presented.
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" The British GoYernment does not appear to know exactly
where they stand with our GoYenunent with regard to the anning of British Inerehantmen. In spite of our general pronouncenwnt to the effect that nwrchantmen may properly be armed for
defensiye purposes they do not know how this would work out in
practice or whether our authorities haYe laid down specific rules
as to what constitutes defensiYe armament or what such rules
might be. They understand in a general way that there is to be a
limitation in number and in calibre of guns and that they should
be mounted at the stern, failing which that ships n1ight be classed
as warships.
" The British authorities look for a recrudescence of sub1narine
actiYity off the American coast as soon as the Allies' reply to the
Pre~ident's note is 1nade public, and they feel it their duty to see
to it that their ships are adequately armed to meet this menace
since from tilne illlmen1orial it has been the undisputed right of
merchantmen to ann for defense. In old times it was not thought
unusual for a nwrchant man to be arnu~d not merely with bow and
stern chasers but with broadsides as well, and the necessity for
this sort of annament is greater to-day than ever before, for,
whereas in old tillles a hostile cruiser would be sighted on the
horizon and the merchantinan would take to flight using her stern
chasers for defense, today a hostile submarine n1ight suddenly appear on the surface a mile ahead of the Inerchant ship and if the
latter mounted guns only at the stern she would be in no position
to defend herself. So n1uch for the number and position of guns.
"'Vith regard to the calibre the .ALlmiralty has knowledge that
the new German submarines carry comparatiYely heaYy guns with
a range of SOinething like 8.000 yards. A merchantman with
guns of less range 1night just as well be totally unarmed.
''A point which seems to 1ne to be of some importance i~ that
the British .Admiralty holds that there is nothing in the question
a~ to whether British merchantn1en are arn1ed for defense or
offense. ""'hatever the armament n1ight be a merchantman to-day
<:>ould be armed only for defense. since there is nothing ufloat
against which she could take the offensive. She can not be arn1ed
for the purpose of seeking out and destro~'ing less heavily armed
ene1ny 1nerchant ships since none such is at present on the high
seas, and it is not reasonable to suppose that a merchant ship,
being without armor-no matter how numerous or hmv heaYy her
guns might be-could possibly be so rash as to attack an enemy
man-of-war, but a heavy and mobile armament obviously seems
necessary for merchantn1en to Ineet the present submarine menace,
and, if there is an~· danger of British merchant ships being re1
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fused clearance papers in American ports because of this, they
ma:r have to give up using American ports whenever possible."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement I, p. 546.)

This position see1ns to indicate a policy on the part o£
the British Govern1nent 'vhich in so1ne respects 'vould
be out of accord with the A1nerican Department of State
n1en1orandun1 of Septen1ber 19, 1914 (1916 Naval \Var
College, International Law Doctunents, p. 93), but the
practice of the 3:uthorities of the United States had been
liberal in construing the Ineinorandtun of September 19,
1914.
The A1nbassador of the United States in Germany
reported on January 21, 1917:
"At 7: 30 yesterday evening 9ount l\Iontgelas of the Foreign
Office called on me and said that the following note ha<l been sent
to the e1nbnssies and legations of several neutral nations, particularly Spain antl Norway, but was not sent to the United
States because that country did not seem to be arming its mer(·hant vessels, that Yon Stnm1n, Undersecretary of State, had
asked him, ~Iontgelas, to give me a copy. l\Iontgelas further said
that Germany had never receded from the position it took concerning armed n1erchant vessels in the Gennan note of February,
1916.
'' The note rerba l e is as follows, and is in French. I send
translation and will send original French tmnorrow in open
cable:
"'According to information worthy of belief which the In1perial
Government has received frmn a neutral country, the British
Government bas endeavored quite recently to decide the neutral
shipowners engaged in transportation on its order to arm their
ships with cannons. Likewise the arman1ent of these neutral
ships has been called for in the most energetic manner by English
public opinion.
" ' In view of these proceedings the German Government thinks
it ought to call the attention of the neutrals to the fact that under
existing conditions, neutral armed merchant ships run the risk
of being taken for armed ene1ny Inerchant ships and of being in
C<Jnsequence attacked, these latter ships maneuvering often under
a neutral flag to lay trap for German subnunines. l\Ioreover
neutral ships of com1nerce which may make use of their temporary annament will he treated as pirates by the Gennan naval
forces.
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"'The Imperial Department for Foreign .Affairs leaves it to
the (space for name of legation) to communicate the preceding
to its government by telegraph. Berlin, the ( ------------------),
to the Legation of ( ____________________ ). '" (Ibid., p. 91.)
Act~·on

of the United States, 1917.-0n ~larch 12, 1917,
w·hile the United States "Tas neutral, the Deparhnent of
State gave to all foreign embassies and legations the following:
" The Department of State bas the honor to state for the information of the -------------------- Embassy that in view of the
announcement of the In1perial German Governnwnt of January 31,
1917, that all ships, those of neutrals included, met within certain
zones of the high seas, would be sunk without any precautions
being taken for the safety of ·the persons on board, and without
the exercise of visit and search, the Government of the United
States has determined to place upon all American merchant vessels sailing through the barred areas an arn1ed guard for the
protection of the vessels and the li-ves of the persons on board."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement I, p. 171.)

Armed neutral merchant vessels in foreign neutral
waters.-Immediately after the ar1ning of neutral merchant vessels, questions arose as to the status of such vessels in foreign neutral waters. So1ne states had prohibited the entrance of armed vessels "rithout limiting the
prohibition to merchant Yessels of belligerents.
In early ~larch 1917 the Departn1ent of State of the
United States sent to Spain, Nor,vay, Sweden, and The
Netherlands a query as to whether those govern1nents prohibited "the entrance and departure of n1erchant vessels
armed for defensive purposes." (Ibid., p. 550.)
The replies 'vere as follows :
Spain, March 4, 1917,
":Minister of Foreign Affairs states there are no restrictions
against entrance or departure from Spanish ports of merchant
vessels armed for defense only and no intention to change such."
(Ibid, p. 551.)

N or"-ray,

~iarch

6, 1917,

" The :Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Norwegian Government does not object to merchant vessels armed
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defensively entering and leaving Norwegian ports, but that such
vessels are subject to exrlmination by naval authorities." (Ibid,
p. 551.)

Sw·eden,

~1arch

6, 1917,

" Foreign Office considers Government's attitude undetermined,
case in point not yet having arisen. l\Iore explicit answer promised
after careful consideration." (Ibid, p. 551)

The Netherlands, :J)farch 10, 1917,
"l\Iinister of Foreign Affairs informs me Dutch Government has
treated armed merchantmen as war vessels since declaration of
neutrality at beginning of war and they are not permitted to enter
territorial waters except under stress of weather, etc. No distinction is made for vessels armed for defensive purposes. This refers
to belligerent vessels. Dutch Government has arrived at no conclusion regai·ding armed neutral vessels. l\Iinister for Foreign
Affairs will inform me of any action which may be taken in this
regard." (Ibid, p. 552)

These replies do not cover the attitude toward ar1ned
neutral merchant vessels and further questions were raised
particularly in regard to the treatment of neutral merchant vessels which had been armed privately and those
which had been .armed and furnished gun crews by a
government.
Later the American Ambassador in Spain informed the
Secretary of State in a telegram of March 18, 1917, that,
" Spanish Government now acting under r'e gulation promulgated
about two years ago which permits merchant vessels carrying one
cannon for defensiYe purposes to enter Spanish ports as merchant
vessels. No distinction is made between neutral and belligerent
vessels nor between merchant vessels armed by private owners or
by Government authorities. l\ferchant vessels armed with more
than one cannon have frequently entered Spanish ports within last
t"·o years and if armament is obviously for defensive purposes
only l\Iinister of State informs me the number of cannon is ignored.
l\1inister further states that no modification of this regulation is
now contemplated. but that at any moment circumstances may
demand a change of policy, in which event the Embassy will be
promptly informed." (Ibid, p. 554)
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The nlinister to s,Yeden, in a telegranl to the Secretary
of State ~1arch 21, 1917, said:
" Foreign :Minister told 1ne to-day he was authorized give verbal
Swedish neutrality rules. Containetl no mention of armed Illerchant vessels, and that for the present Swedish Government was
unable make any definite decision, but reserved the right to treat
each case separately later in conference. I drew fron1 Foreign
~linister the staten1ent that for the present armed American merchant vessels, whether armed by the Government or by the owners, would be allowed freely to enter and depart fr01n Swedish
ports as heretofore. In reply to my inquiry the :Minister for
Foreign Affairs confidentially stated that Sweden did not care to
set a precedent on this question at present, but preferred to await
developments, and that in not uefinitely com1nitting themselves at
present, Sweden obviated what n1ight lead to some embarrassment
wHh neighboring countries. I learned to-day from high Swedish
official that Danish representative will make shnilar reply." (Ibid,
pp. 554-55.)

The reply of the Nether lands ""as embodied in a coJnmunication of nlarch 22, 1917:
"By virtue of the Royal Decree of July 30, 1914, the presence of
war vessels or vessels assinlila ted thereto belonging to foreign
powers within the territorial waters of the :Netherlands is not pernlitted.
"Armed merchant vessels fall within the category of vessels
without any distinction being made between the case where the
owner of the ship has furnished her with armament on his own
authority and the case where the foreign government has placed a
military force on board the vessel for her protection.
"The Royal De<·ree does not apply to the colonies of the Netherlands." (Ibid., 11. 555.)

These replies do not sho"" any clear unanin1ity of opinion as to ""hat should be thP rule of treabnent of armed
neutral n1erchant Yessels.
(a) Transfer of i·essels before ttcar.-In case of a
transfer before 'var the nationality of a ship 'vas presumed to be that of the flag it had a right to fly. The
right to fly the flag might be questioned, but, 'vhen
proven that was till the
orld ,~Var and by n1ost states
during the
orld 'Var regarded as conclusive as to the
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nationality of the vessel. Good faith in the transfer
would, of course, be essential. It "1'ould be difficult to
assume that transfer 15 days before the outbreak of
war in accord with the la 'v of the vendor and in accord
with the law of the vendee could be proven invalid, and
a purchaser would be justified in resting his title on conformity to la'v without even raising the question of intent or good faith in such a case.
Of course an entirely different type of question arises
in case of transfers after the outbreak of war.
(b) Seizure of flour on the Dale.-The Dale, a vessel
of the Blue Line, had sailed before the outbreak of 'var
and the title to the flour was in the 1nerchant of state X
and was to be paid for by the merchant of state D on delivery. The merchant of state D after the declaration_
of war, by a change in ter1ns of the original transaction,
does obtain title to the flour by telegraph. The flour is~
of enemy origin and enen1y goods, and a transfer, which
'vould have been valid in time of peace is not valid
in time of war. The transfer is not valid and the flour ·
is liable to capture and condemnation.
( o) 0 onvoy.-Many of the rules issued by maritiine·
states subsequent to 1909 and before 1915 embodied in
some form, so far as convoy 'vas concerned, Articles 61
and 62 of the Declaration of London. This 'vas true of
the French instructions of 1912; the Japanese regulations
of 1914; the Italian decree of 1915; and the instructions
of the United States of 1915 and 1917.
'I'he use of convoy 'vas therefore considered la,vful and
probable at the outbreak of the ,~Vorld "\Var, though of
course the right of convoy 'Yould not extend to the protection of vessels engaged in unla ,vfnl undertakings. The
legality of the conduct of vessels under convoy is vouched
for by the coininander of the convoy, and if a comn1ander
of a vessel of 'var of either of the belligerents questions
the conduct of a vessel under convoy the n1atter should be
investigated in good faith.
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(d) ill erclzant vessels and S'l.tbn~arines.-Article 22 of
the London Naval Treaty of 1930 is as follo"rs:
"The following are accepted as established rules of International
Law:
"(1) In their action with regard to tnerchant ships, submarines
must confonn to the rules of International Law to which surface
vessels are subject.
" ( 2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to
s'Cop on being duly sumn10ned, or of actiYe resistance to visit or
search, a warship, whether surface Yessel or submarine, n1ay not
sink or render incapable of nayigation a merchant vessel without
haYing first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place
of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as
a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is
assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proxinlity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.
"The High Contl.tcting Parties invite all other Powers to express
their assent to the aboYe rules." (1930 Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 159.)

The significance of this article in its relation to subinarines and ar1ned vessels "~as discussed quite fully at the
J\' a val ''Tar College in 1930. rrhe questions involved in
Situation I, 1930, "~ere~ ho,Yever, 1nainly in regard to
relations of belligerent subn1arines and 1nerchant Yessels
of belligerents, and the rights of belligerents in regard to
one. another are under consideration, but Article 22 of
the London Naval Treaty of 1930 applies not only to
belligerents but also to neutrals, and a neutral 'vould have
even less justification for disregarding its provisions and
in a la,vfnlly conducted war no justification.
SOLUTION

(a) The seizure of the ships of the Blue Line on
~larch 20 as ene1ny property is not lawful.
(b) The seizure of the cargo of flour as enemy property on the Dale on 1\farch 21 is lawful. The transfer by
telegraph on 1\Iarch 19 'vas not a valid transfer as against
state Y.
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(c) State E has a lawful right to convoy its merchant
vessels. The right to conyoy ai)plies to innocent vessels
only and -does not i1nply a total denial of the right to
\·1sit and search.
(d) The arming of neutral 1nerchant vessels is not unlawful though since the London Xaval Treaty of 1930,
article 22, prestuned unnecessary and undesirable. Since
the Treaty of 1930 the order in regard to sinking subnlarines "\Yould be unla Y\tul for state.; partj es to article 22.

